Lord Ismay, the first secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), famously remarked in the early 1950s that the purpose of the nascent alliance was “to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The conclusion of the recent NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, provides a propitious opportunity to consider if this early assessment of the alliance’s founding raison d’être remains valid.
Let’s start with keeping the Russians out. Of the three initial stipulations expressed by Lord Ismay, the injunction against Moscow resonates most clearly to this day. Aside from a brief post-Cold War honeymoon in the 1990s when there was idealistic talk on both sides of the former Iron Curtain that Russia might become a future member of the alliance, the consistent reality of post-World War II European geopolitics has been the military threat posed by the Kremlin to the heartland of Europe. Russia’s long-term assault on Ukraine, launched in 2014 with the occupation of Crimea and expanded in the 2022 full-scale invasion, has unequivocally substantiated Ismay’s warning from the 1950s.
The expansion of NATO in the early 2000s, which Moscow uses to partly justify its revanchist policies on the continent, was pursued primarily to extend the benefits of Western economic and political systems to those aggrieved lands between Germany and Russia, to include many of the classic capitals of Central and Eastern Europe that Winston Churchill named in his 1946 “Iron Curtain” speech. It is no surprise, therefore, that following the collapse of the Soviet empire, the nations of the region immediately mustered at NATO’s door, in large part because of their collective tragic history in the crosshairs of the Kremlin’s malign intentions. Despite the euphoric glow of the post-1989 revolutions, the Czechs, Poles, Romanians and others knew that it was only a matter of time before the Russian bear returned to the hunt.
Although the threat from the east remains axiomatic, the position of the United States vis-a-vis the alliance is in flux. It bears noting that America’s strategic readjustment regarding NATO did not start with our current commander in chief. In fact, every U.S. president in this century has badgered our European NATO allies to take more responsibility for their own defense. More specifically on this theme, Operation Unified Protector — the alliance’s 2011 military intervention in Libya — featured President Obama’s oxymoronic policy of “leading from behind,” whereby U.S. forces focused on rear-echelon and logistics, deferring combat operations to its allies.
From Washington’s standpoint, the unstated agreement from the early years of NATO that Europe should concentrate on recovering its political, economic and societal health following the destruction of World War II and America would assume the military lead in staring down the Soviet Union no longer applies. The core truth is that the European members of the alliance constitute approximately 600 million people and one of the globe’s most powerful economic zones. Russia, the continent’s clear and present danger, boasts a shrinking population of 143 million and a gross domestic product less than 15% of NATO’s European contingent. Consequently, with effective political will, Europe can and should do much more for its own defense.
The challenge, however, is for Brussels and Washington to agree on a logical and gradual transition from an overdependence on America in the military realm to a more balanced approach in which Europe takes the lead on the majority of continental defense requirements while the U.S. continues to provide crucial leadership and unique military support to deter the Kremlin’s thinly disguised aspirations for territorial aggrandizement. One must bear in mind that, despite all the performative bluster by America’s current president regarding the alliance, as of this writing we continue to be a member in (quasi?) good standing.
This brings us to the last of Ismay’s core tenets for NATO: to keep the Germans down. At present, this seems counterproductive and, in fact, European views on German military power have evolved considerably over time, particularly since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. As such, starting with former Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s “zeitenwende” (historic turning point) speech in February 2022 calling for increased defense spending and continuing with current Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s aggressive call to arms, Berlin has committed to a significant rearmament program that will, in the coming years, yield the strongest military in Western Europe.
While this development should be, at first glance, good news for European security, there is a “careful what you ask for” element to German military prominence at the center of the continent. Given that the alt-right party, Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, or AfD), is poised to come to power in the not-too-distant future, senior officials in Paris, London, Brussels, Prague and Warsaw may soon succumb to discomforting flashbacks of the 1930s, the last time rapid rearmament and political extremism concurrently ruled the roost in Germany.
Though it is highly unlikely that Berlin will once again become a menace to its neighbors, the wider NATO community, with full engagement from Washington, needs to ensure that Germany’s inevitable military rise occurs in a positive manner as part of Europe’s collective defense, in the process helping to prevent further Russian aggression and to forestall broader American disengagement from the continent.
Robert Beck of Peterborough is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. After serving for 30 years in U.S embassies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, he now teaches foreign policy classes at lifelong learning programs at both Keene State College and Rivier University.